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TEACHING EFFECTIVE ORAL 
ARGUMENT SKILLS: FORGET ABOUT 
THE DRAMA COACH 
Michael Vitiello· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over twenty years ago, questions about lawyers' compe-
tence led the American Bar Association (ABA) to study the 
adequacy of skills training in law schools. 1 Along with a focus 
on skills generally, the ABA appointed a committee to study 
whether law schools were successfully teaching appellate ad-
vocacy skills. 2 The ABA eventually agreed with the committee 
report, which was critical of both law school curricular offer-
ings in appellate advocacy and traditional moot court competi-
tions.3 
A 1984 ABA survey indicated that a significant majority 
of all law schools had moot court programs that failed to teach 
• Professor of Law, The University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law; 
B.A., 1969, Swarthmore College; J.D., 1974 , University of Pennsylvania . I wish to 
express my continuing appreciation for the Deans' support of scholarship at 
McGeorge . I also wish to thank my research assistants, Sharon Everett , Justin C. 
Wynne , and Niki Zupanic for their excellent efforts in putting this article togeth-
er. 
I See ROGER C. CRAMTON, A.B.A. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS 
TO THE BAR, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAWYER COMPETENCY: THE ROLE OF 
THE LAW SCHOOLS iii (1979) (stating that Chief Justice Warren E. Burger's criti-
cism of the competency of lawyers led, in part, to the creation of an ABA task 
force that studied practical skills training in American law schools) [hereinafter 
CRAMTON]. 
2 See Comm. on Appellate Skills Training, Appellate Lit igation Skills Train-
ing : The Role of the Law Schools, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 129, 133-34 (1985) [herein-
after Committee) . 
3 See id. 
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essential advocacy skills . 4 I have found no similar data focus-
ing on appellate advocacy and moot court courses since the 
ABA report. In light of that, I asked my research assistants to 
survey law schools around the country to assess whether the 
law schools have upgraded their advocacy training. 5 The sur-
vey found that law schools have improved their advocacy pro-
grams. 6 However, this raises questions of whether law schools 
have gone far enough to address the concerns raised by the 
ABA report. 
The conclusion that law schools have not gone far enough 
in upgrading their oral advocacy training finds support in the 
continued criticism of student advocate and practicing lawyers' 
oral advocacy skills. Contemporary critics of moot court pro-
grams believe the programs reward the wrong skills-they are 
correct. The most significant lingering criticism of oral argu-
ments is that attorneys fail to appreciate the primary purpose 
of their fifteen or twenty minutes before the court. 7 Some 
commentators speculate that courts have limited oral argu-
ment, both in length and availability, because judges find the 
quality of those arguments poor. 8 
• See id. at 141. 
6 See infra App. A (reporting the results of an informal survey of web sites 
and interviews with appellate advocacy and legal writing faculty from forty-four 
law schools). 
• See infra App. B. 
7 See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Appellate Advocacy , 50 S.C. L. REV. 
567, 569 (1999) (discussing the importance of oral advocacy in addressing the 
judges' questions and concerns); William H. Rehnquist, Oral Advocacy : A Disap-
pearing Art, 35 MERCER L. REV. 1015, 1021-1022 (1983 ) (emphasizing the ways in 
which oral argument assists the court); see also Frederick Bernays Wiener, Oral 
Advocacy 62 HARV. L . REV. 56, 58 (1948) (arguing that cases are won or lost on 
oral argument). 
• See DAVID C. FREDERICK, THE ART OF ORAL ADVOCACY 2 (2003) (arguing 
that if the Supreme Court and courts of appeals were to further limit "the avail-
ability of oral argument , a principal reason would be long-expressed disappoint-
ment by judges and justices with the quality of oral advocacy."). But see Mark R. 
Kravitz , Words to the Wise, 5 J . APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 534, 546 (2003) (arguing 
that "while lawyers certainly bear responsibility for the quality of their appellate 
advocacy, there is a certain circularity in such arguments. For as judges reduce 
the number of cases they set for argument, they also necessarily reduce the op-
portW1ities for lawyers to hone their skills and become better oral advocates."). 
2006) EFFECTNE ORAL AllGUMENT SKILLS 871 
The fact that law schools have increased resources devot-
ed to advocacy training begs the question why we still lack 
qualified oral advocates. That is the central question that this 
article explores. Absent empirical data that explain the poor 
state of oral advocacy, I rely on thirty years of experience as a 
law professor, as an advocate, and as a coach of numerous 
moot court teams and director of two different moot court-
appellate advocacy programs to explore this question. 9 
First, while law schools have paid greater attention to 
advocacy training over the past twenty years, we still have a 
long way to go. Too many programs are still the province of 
inexperienced professors. 10 Students have too few opportuni-
ties to give oral arguments, and involvement in advocacy is 
typically not required beyond the first year legal writing pro-
gram . 11 Second, I suspect that many programs still do not 
teach the "right stuff." Instead, student advocates treat oral 
argument as a show .12 
A less obvious explanation of poor advocacy skills is that 
law schools have become "kinder and gentler" 13 places over 
• Upon graduation from the University of Pennsylvania Law School, I clerked 
for the Honorable J. Sydney Hoffman, a judge on Pennsylvania's Superior Court, 
that state's intermediate appellate court. I began teaching at Loyola (New Or-
leans} Law School in 1977. While at Loyola, I handled a number of appeals and 
argued motions in federal and state trial courts. From 1986 until 1990, along 
with my colleague Patrick Hugg, I ran a moot court program designed to address 
many of the criticisms raised by the ABA report. In addition, I served as the 
faculty advisor to the National Moot Court team. Since beginning at McGeorge 
School of Law, I have coached a dozen National Appellate Advocacy Competition 
teams over a six year period, with half of them qualifying for the national compe-
tition rounds and five of them advancing at least as far as the semi-final round. 
In addition, for seven years, beginning in the mid-1990s, I designed and directed 
an appellate advocacy program. As with the program at Loyola, McGeorge 's pro-
gram addresses many of the concerns expressed in the ABA report. 
10 See infra App. B, tbl. 2 (summarizing the appellate advocacy experience of 
the faculty at some law schools within the survey). 
11 See id. tbl. 1 (indicating that most of the required courses that included in-
struction in oral advocacy were first-year legal writing classes). 
l2 See HENRY D. GABRIEL & SIDNEY POWELL, FEDERAL APPELLATE PRACTICE: 
FIFTH CIRCUIT 7-7 (1994) (quoting Judge Henry Politz as stating that, "[t]he tone 
should be conversational and persuasive. Questions should be welcomed.''). 
13 See Celestial S.D. Cassman & Lisa R. Pruitt, A Kinder, Gentler Law 
School? Race, Ethnicity, Gender, and Legal Education at King Hall, 38 U.C. DA-
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the past thirty years. In many schools, the Socratic method is 
under attack .14 Used rigorously, the Socratic method is an 
effective tool for teaching essential skills of oral advocacy, 
especially the ability to respond thoughtfully to questions. 15 
Instead, many law professors, imbued with the notion that the 
Socratic method is bad for their students, conduct broad policy 
discussions where students' opinions are valued more than are 
carefully framed legal arguments. 16 
Section II of this article reviews the ABA's criticisms of 
moot court programs and summarizes our findings about the 
current state of moot court and appellate advocacy training . 
Section III discusses why, even though many law schools have 
upgraded their moot court courses, many judges and commen-
tators still lament the relatively poor advocacy skills of law-
yers appearing before them. Specifically, Section III discusses 
some of the myths about what constitutes effective oral advo-
cacy . Further, it argues that the trend towards "kinder and 
gentler" legal education has led to a less rigorous use of the 
Socratic dialogue and that, when properly used, the Socratic 
method is an effective tool by which many lawyers learned the 
art of oral advocacy. By way of conclusion, Section IV offers 
some suggestions to improve the quality of oral advocacy 
training . 
VIS L. REV. 1209 , 1225-28 (2005) (discussing the methods that King Hall has used 
to promote its image of a kinder gentler law school). 
" Michael Vitiello, Professor Kingsfield : The Most Misunderstood Character in 
Literature, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 955 (2005); see also James R. Beattie Jr ., Socratic 
Ignorance : Once More Into the Cave, 105 W. VA. L . REV. 471 , 472 (2003) (giving 
an overview of the common attacks to the Socratic method ); Ruta K. Stropus, 
Mend It, Bend It, and Extend It: The Fate of Traditional Law School Methodology 
in the 21st Century , 27 Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 449 (1996 ) (giving an overview of the 
psychological negatives of the Socratic method) . 
15 See Vitiello, supra note 14, at 987-88 (explaining that the Socrat ic method 
prepares students for future encounters with judges who will expect them to 
answer questions quickly and effectively while under pressure) . 
" Id . at 972-73 (describing new practices of schools that have abandoned the 
Socrat ic method ). 
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II. TEACHING APPELLATE ADVOCACY 
During the 1980s, the ABA closely focused "on the lawyer-
ing skills or lack thereof of members of the bar, whether and 
to what extent these skills can be taught in law school, and 
how much of the limited resources of the law schools should 
be devoted to teaching them. "17 That focus produced a num-
ber of widely debated reports 18 and a continuing debate about 
the importance of teaching practical skills in law school. 19 
Less widely reported was the ABA's consideration of appellate 
advocacy. 20 
In 1984, the Appellate Judges' Conference of the ABA 
assigned a committee the task of studying the special prob-
lems related to training appellate lawyers. The committee's 
report, issued in 1985, was highly critical of traditional moot 
court programs and competitions. 21 
Much of its report focused on appellate practice as a dis-
crete sub-specialty. For example, the committee found that 
law schools failed to train lawyers in rules of appellate prac-
tice, rules such as those governing appeals, petitions for ex-
traordinary relief, motions, settlement conferences, oral argu-
ment, rehearing, seeking review, and more. 22 The committee 
also focused on other special aspects of appellate litigation, 
11 See Committee , supra note 2, at 130. 
,. See id . at 131; see, e.g., CRAMTON, supra note 1; SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. 
AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, LEGAL EDUCATION AND 
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT: AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM (1992) [hereinafter 
MACCRATE REPORT). 
19 The February 2005 approval by the ABA House of Delegates of revised law 
school certification standards, including a strengthened skills requirement , shows 
that the ABA and , specifically , the Section on Legal Education and Admissions to 
the Bar have been focusing on improving skills training in law schools. A.B.A. 
House of Delegates Report 105B, at 2-3 (Feb . 2005 ) (hereinafter Delegates Re-
port). 
20 See Committee, supra note 2, at 131. 
21 Id. at 137 ("(Tlhe appellate court as an institution and its relationship to 
the trial court is almost completely ignored in the normal law school curricu-
lum ."); id. at 141 ("It is clear that the traditional appellate advocacy program pro-
vides almost none of the fundamental or specialized knowl edge or skill s that are 
essential to an appellate litigator ."). 
22 Id. at 138. 
874 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 75 
such as the need for attorneys to learn how to extract facts 
from a full appellate record 23 and to understand the standard 
of review on appeal. 24 
Beyond identifying the failure to teach these specialized 
skills, the report criticized moot court programs and competi-
tions at a more general level. The report focused on the fact 
that upper level students or instructors with little appellate 
experience taught most moot court classes .25 As the report 
concluded, "there must be training by a qualified instructor in 
the special skills of appellate brief writing and oral argument, 
particularly in working with a realistic appellate record ."26 
While the report noted the addition of appellate litigation 
skills courses by some schools, such courses remained the 
exception. 27 
Although the report recorded the expansion of interscho-
lastic moot court competitions, it concluded that these failed to 
teach meaningful skills for many of the same reasons that 
traditional moot court classes also failed to do so.28 The re-
port recommended that control be shifted from student moot 
court boards to experienced appellate instructors . 29 For exam-
ple, the report insists that meeting the recommendations of 
the report "demands ... an instructor who has the knowledge 
and specialized skills in all aspects of appellate litigation." 30 
The report made its conclusion explicit: "[I]t should be clear 
that the prevailing practice of assigning third year students or 
23 See id. at 139 (focusing on the necessity for appellate advocates to be able 
to sift through a trial record). 
24 See id. at 138 (discussing the important procedural rules that appellate 
advocates need to know including the proper standard of review). 
25 See id. at 149; see also infra note 31 and accompanying text. 
26 Committee, supra note 2, at 143. 
27 See id. at 143-44 (summarizing the results of a survey of law school cours-
es in appellate advocacy). 
•• See id. at 145-46 (noting that moot court competitions, like appellate advo-
cacy programs, suffer from inadequate instruction and limited application to pro-
fessional appellate practice). 
29 See id. at 146 (suggesting ways that moot court programs could be restruc-
tured to provide better appellate experience, including the use of appellate litiga-
tors instead of students as instructors). 
30 Id . at 148. 
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new law school graduates the major responsibility to teach 
appellate advocacy programs or supervise moot court competi-
tions is not desirable. "31 
Finally, the report identified the lack of adequate teaching 
material as another source of concern. For example, it ob-
served that "the two most widely adopted books for use in this 
program were prepared by law students ."32 While the report 
recognized that some recently published material was better 
suited for upgraded appellate advocacy programs, 33 it also 
found lacking the availability of realistic appellate litigation 
problems. 34 
Significant changes have occurred in the more than twen-
ty years since the ABA's adoption of the committee report. For 
example, many law schools have upgraded their legal writing 
programs. 35 To comply with ABA requirements, law schools 
now give legal writing instructors tenure or, at a minimum, 
long term contracts. 36 The result should be a more profession-
al group of teachers, interested in making a career out of 
31 Id . at 149. The report relied on a then-current survey indicating that "the 
large majority of instructors responsible for research and writing programs for 
first year students are recent law school graduates or third year law students ." 
Id. (citing Survey: Staffing of Legal Writing Programs in AALS Schools, 1982-1983 
(Oct. 4, 1983) (conducted by Robert Cane , Director of Legal Writing, University of 
Puget Sound School of Law)). 
32 Committee, supra note 2, at 149:- . . 
33 Id . at 149-50. 
34 Id . at 150-51. 
34 See Kristin Gerdy & Toni Berres-Paul, 2004 Survey Results, 2004 Ass'N 
LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS & LEGAL WRITING INST. 10, available at 
http://www.alwd .org/alwdresources/surveys/2004surveyresults. pdf (last visited Feb . 
23, 2006 ); see also Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing in the Twenty-First Century : 
The First Images, 1 LEGAL WRITING 123, 129 (1991) (noting that seventy-five 
percent of responding schools "formally include moot court as part of the LRW 
program .... Eighty-three percent include an appellate brief argument ." (citation 
omitted)). 
36 A.B.A., SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR, STANDARDS: 
RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS § 405(d) (2005-2006) ("A 
law school shall afford legal writing teachers such security of position and other 
rights and pr ivileges of faculty membership as may be necessary to ( 1) attract 
and retai n a faculty that is well qualified to provide legal writing instruction ... 
and (2) safeguard academic freedom."), available at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/ 
standards/standards .html (last visited Feb. 23, 2006). 
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teaching . 
Anecdotally, I am aware that some law schools have up-
graded their moot court programs; 37 however, in preparing 
this article, my research assistants and I could find no system-
atic report measuring the extent to which law schools have 
upgraded those programs. To fill that gap we surveyed rough-
ly twenty-five percent of ABA accredited law schools to deter-
mine how each teaches oral advocacy skills. The survey in-
cluded responses from forty-four schools, with schools included 
from each of the four tiers identified by the U.S. News and 
World Report's rankings of American law schools. 38 
A full summary of our survey appears as Appendix A to 
this article. Although some areas of concern remain, law 
schools have upgraded their advocacy offerings since the publi-
cation of the ABA report: the typical program is no longer run 
by students, 39 most courses are graded (instead of 
pass/fail),4° a majority of schools no longer pair students, and 
about seventy-five percent have students argue individual-
ly .41 A number of schools have created appellate practice 
courses and appellate clinics. 42 Furthermore, a significant 
number of schools use actual transcripts or realistic appellate 
problems. 43 In addition, advocacy teachers no longer face a 
lack of adequate teaching materials, which was one of the 
concerns raised by the ABA report. 44 Today any number of 
good books on advocacy 45 and realistic appellate problems are 
3' I have been involved with upgrading the appellate advocacy-moot court 
class at two different law schools. For a description of the program that was 
implemented at McGeorge, see MICHAEL R. FONTHAM, ET AL., TEACHER'S MANUAL 
FOR PERSUASIVE WRITTEN AND ORAL ADVOCACY: IN TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS 
102-09 (2002 ) [hereinafter TEACHER'S MANUAL]. 
38 See infra App. B. 
39 See id. tbl. 2 (repo rting the type of instructors utilized for the courses sur-
veyed) . 
•• See id. tbl. 1. 
41 See id. 
•• See id. (list ing the courses surveyed). 
43 See id . (indicating that nineteen schools, for which data on this question 
were available use re al case record s to develop the problem used for the oral 
argument ). 
•• Committee, sup ra note 2, at 149-51 . 
•• See RUGGERO J . ALDISERT, WINNING ON APPEAL: BETTER BRIEFS AND ORAL 
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available. 46 These findings suggest that schools have been 
attentive to the concerns raised in the ABA report . 
Our findings also suggest that law schools could go fur-
ther in teaching advocacy skills. For example, the forty-four 
law schools surveyed offered a total of eighty-six courses that 
included some instruction on appellate advocacy .47 Some of 
those courses were upper level electives and appellate clin-
ics. 48 About half of the course offerings were required, but 
most of those are first year legal research and writing cours-
es. 49 A number of the elective courses had enrollment caps, 
suggesting that they are not widely available to students .50 
The staffing of advocacy courses also presents a mixed 
picture. We found only one course still taught exclusively by 
students, while three other schools relied on students to sup-
plement faculty instruction. 51 Tenure and non-tenure track 
faculty co-teach a dozen of the courses, while the remaining 
courses are evenly split between tenure and non-tenure track 
faculty. 52 Many of the non-tenure track faculty have long 
term contracts, which is the minimum currently required by 
the ABA. 53 The fact that many instructors have the ABA 
minimum of a long term contracts is not surprising because 
many of the courses teaching advocacy skills are first year 
legal writing classes. 54 
Measuring whether those teaching advocacy have mean-
ARGUMENT (2d ed . 2003) ; MARY BETH BEAZLEY, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO APPELLATE 
ADVOCACY (2002) ; MICHAEL R. FONTHAM, ET AL., PERSUASIVE WRITTEN AND ORAL 
ADVOCACY: IN TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS (2002 ) [hereinafter ORAL ADVOCACY]; 
FREDERICK, supra note 8. 
'" See Committee , supra note 2, at 151 (reporting the offer from clerks of the 
United States Courts of Appeals to identify and prepare records for use in appel-
late advocacy classes and competitions). 
47 See infra App . B, tbl. 1. 
•e See id. 
•• See id. 
50 See id. (noting that eighteen courses had enr ollm ent caps ranging from 
eight to forty-two students per semester) . 
., See id . tbl. 2. 
52 See id . 
• 3 See supra note 36 and accompanying text . 
•• See infra App . B, tbl. 1 
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ingful experience, as urged by the ABA report, 55 proved diffi-
cult because we were not in a position to assess the quality of 
the professors' appellate litigation experience. Instead, we 
looked at the professors' biographies to determine whether 
they had appellate experience. 56 We found that thirty-eight of 
the courses were taught by faculty with some appellate experi-
ence; in many cases, though, that was limited to work as a 
judicial law clerk or as counsel in a small number of appellate 
cases. 57 
While our survey suggests that schools have upgraded 
their advocacy programs since the ABA report, at many 
schools training remains limited. For example, many schools 
do not require a course dedicated entirely to advocacy train-
ing. 58 As a result, the only oral advocacy training that many 
students receive is a single argument in a first year legal 
writing course. This training is likely to be inadequate. When 
it occurs during a course in which a student must learn re-
search, proper citation, and writing skills, the legal writing in-
structor has only a little time to teach a great deal about oral 
advocacy skills. At best, such a course may require a student 
to give a single graded oral argument. 59 
Beyond the limited opportunities to present oral argu-
ments, the high percentage of courses taught by non-tenure 
track faculty suggests another limitation on oral advocacy 
training. Our study suggests that many faculty members have 
limited appellate experience 60 and students may interpret a 
school's decision to leave advocacy training to non-tenure 
•• See supra note 2, at 151. 
" In order to determine the relevant appellate advocacy experience of the 
faculty teaching the courses surveyed, my research assistants searched Westlaw 
databases for instances of specific faculty members appearing «as coun sel" before 
appellate courts and also examined the faculty biographies provided by the law 
schools on their web sites. 
• 1 See infra App . B, tbl. 2 (summarizing our findings regarding th e appellate 
advocacy experience for some faculty members, where such information wa s ava il-
able). 
51 See infra App. B. 
H Gerdy & Berres-Paul , supra note 35, at 6-19. 
"" See supra note 57 and accompanying text . 
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track instructors with this limited experience as a signal that 
the course is not especially important . 
III. WHY THE QUALITY OF ORAL ARGUMENT 
HAS NOT IMPROVED 
A Myths About Effective Oral Advocacy 
Our survey demonstrates an improvement in advocacy 
training since the ABA report. Despite this trend, judges and 
many commentators still complain about the poor quality of 
oral arguments . 61 We could find no empirical research that 
explains why the problem persists. 62 
This section considers why law schools are not doing a 
better job producing qualified oral advocates even though they 
are devoting more resources to their advocacy programs. Fur-
ther, this section argues that many programs still reward the 
wrong skills. 
Even as schools devote greater resources to advocacy 
training, some commentators still point to the poor quality of 
that training as the source of the problem. For example, in 
1997, Judge Alex Kozinski stated that moot court programs 
and competitions taught student advocates to be "witty, 
charming, direct and forthright," but that those were the qual-
ities of a "Boy Scout or a lapdog," not those of a persuasive 
advocate. 63 He is not alone in that critical assessment .64 I 
61 See Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 569 (discussing advocates unwillingness to 
respond to judges' questions); Wiener, supra note 7 ("Within the year I have been 
told by a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States that four out of ev-
ery five arguments to which he must listen are 'not good.'"). 
62 Most of the discussions of oral advocacy skills are anecdotal. See Alex 
Kozinski, In Prai se of Moot Court - Not!, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 178 (1997) (discuss-
ing the many problems with moot court programs) . But see Michael V. 
Hernandez, In Defense of Moot Court: A Response to "In Priase of Moot Court -
Not!", 17 REV. LITIG. 69 (1998) (rebutting Judge Kozinski 's arguments about moot 
court programs) . 
63 Kozinski, supra note 62, at 183. 
•• William H. Kenety, Observations on Teaching Appellate Advocacy , 45 J . LE-
GAL EDUC . 582 , 584 (1995) (discussing the skills taught by moot court programs 
vers us tho se needed for appellate advocacy); see also BEAZLEY, supra note 45, at 
202. 
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share the same concern. 
Judge Ruggero Aldisert summarizes the prevailing view of 
why oral argument matters. 65 Among several goals, the oral 
advocate should take advantage of this singular opportunity to 
talk directly to the decision maker. 66 Taking advantage of 
that opportunity means emphasizing the pivotal issues in the 
brief and coming to "grips with real questions that trouble the 
court." 67 Other commentators have suggested that lawyers 
misconstrue the purpose of oral argument and view it as high 
drama in which they are giving a theatrical performance. 68 
Instead, effective oral argument should amount to an engaged 
conversation with the court. 69 
We cannot hope for better oral advocacy training until 
moot court classes and competitions recognize why oral advo-
cacy matters. Were an educated novice to observe moot court 
arguments and listen to the post-argument critiques, the ob-
server would have a skewed understanding about oral argu-
ment. Critics of traditional moot court programs and competi-
tions have it right when they argue that "the moot court focus 
is oft.en on scoring points and displaying verbal brilliance." 70 
In effect, they teach that style is more important than sub-
65 ALDISERT, supra note 45, at 32-33. 
86 See id. at 32 ("Oral argument is the only opportunity the lawyer has to 
personally motivate the judges by force of his or her personality, and convey what 
Bettinghaus described as [the) three factors that people use in judging a speaker's 
credibility-trustworthiness, qualifications and personal characteristics."). 
67 Id. at 32-33 (listing as goals of oral argument, correcting misimpressions of 
fact or law held by the judges and demonstrating the logical soundness of the 
argument). 
•• See Kenety supra note 64, at 584-85 (discussing the tendency of moot 
courts to reward verbal aptitude rather than substance); Kozinski, supra note 62, 
at 182 ("In moot court, the game consists of making yourself sound clever."). 
69 GABRIEL & POWELL, supra note 12, at 7-7 (quoting Judge Henry Politz as 
stating that "counsel [should) approach the lectern as though she were going to 
discuss an interesting and important point of law with three of her senior law 
partners. The tone should be conversational and persuasive.") ; see also ALDISERT, 
supra note 45, at 311 (quoting Justice Ronald T.Y. Moon, "[o]ral argument is not 
a speech but a discussion with the appellate judges. "); ORAL ADVOCACY, supra 
note 45, at 194 ("If you engage in give-and-take with the judges, you have the 
best opportunity to influence their views ."). 
7° Kenety, supra note 64, at 584. 
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stance . Such an approach misses the point of oral advocacy as 
a unique opportunity to speak directly to the decision maker 
in one's case. 71 
My experience as a moot court coach showed me many 
"ills" of traditional moot court programs and competitions. My 
observations are anecdotal, but based on years of involvement 
with moot court programs and competitions. 72 
Consider the selection of moot court competition teams. At 
many schools, a student board runs the moot court competi-
tion program. Such boards often jealously guard their preroga-
tive to select their successors and members of interscholastic 
teams. Members of student boards often view moot court to be 
in competition with law review. 73 Board members may resent 
the academic success of their law review colleagues and view 
moot court as a place where less academically successful stu-
dents can excel. 74 
This attitude favors style over substance. Students who 
have not excelled academically are less able to assess an intel-
lectually compelling argument than they are able to identify 
an argument that is delivered with flair. In selecting their 
successors, they are likely to favor students who share their 
skills and values. When I coached moot court teams but did 
not select the team members, I was often saddled with advo-
cates who were stylish, but superficial. 
I still shudder when I recall one of those advocates. In 
competition, one of the judges was a prominent civil rights 
lawyer who had argued some of the cases that were relevant 
to that year's problem. I sat in discomfort as the judge de-
railed the student advocate. When the judge pressed the stu-
71 See infra note 95 and accompanying text . 
72 See supra note 8. 
73 M.A. Stapleton, Mootness the Issue in Student Court Contests, CHI. DAILY L. 
BULL ., Feb. 21, 1997, at 3. 
74 See Committee, supra note 2, at 145 (stating that this model originated at 
Harvard Law School in the early twentieth-century "to keep up the interest of 
those students who did not do well enough in the first year to rank high in the 
class." ); see also Stapleton , supra note 73, at 3 (holding up moot court programs 
as an alternative for those students who do not qualify for law review). 
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dent, he tried to go back to his canned answers and seemed to 
treat the questions as an unwelcome distraction. His failure to 
advance to the next round was appropriate; but had he not 
run into a well informed judge, the judges might have reward-
ed his slick presentation. This example is illustrative of the 
weaknesses in traditional moot court programs and classes. 
First, too many competitions reward style over sub-
stance. 75 This may result from poorly prepared judges who 
are often seen scanning the bench brief during the argument 
and, judging from the quality of their questions or from their 
silence, scanning it for the first time. 76 Judges who lack fa-
miliarity with the nuances of the case are more likely to fall 
back on style as a basis to select a winner. They may also 
overvalue glib arguments that sound good at the moment but 
would not hold up if the judges were to examine the plausibili-
ty of the arguments in light of the controlling case law. 77 
Overvaluing form over substance may also result from the 
grading criteria used in some competitions . The competition 
may give speaking style as much credit as substance of the 
argument. Below, I have attached a copy of a grading sheet 
used in McGeorge's Appellate Advocacy program .78 We de-
signed our program to reward substance and to focus on the 
advocate's ability to answer the judges' questions. 79 It is inev-
itable that, to some extent, grading criteria in any course will 
tend to reflect forensic skills, but the McGeorge grading sheet 
gives less emphasis to style than do many similar grading 
sheets in use elsewhere. 80 
10 See John T. Gaubatz, Moot Court in the Modern Law School , 31 J . LEGAL 
EDUC. 87 (1982); Kenety , supra note 64, at 584; Kozinski , supra note 62, at 182. 
16 See Hernandez, supra note 62, at 84 (discussing the poor quality of moot 
court judges); Kenety , supra note 64, at 584-85 (noting "lm)oot court judges are 
far more likely than real judges to be unprepared or to ask off-the-wall ques-
tions.") . 
11 See Gaubatz, supra note 75; Kenety, supra note 64, at 584; Kozinski, supra 
note 62, at 182. 
71 See infra App. A. 
71 For more on my views on teaching appellate advocacy, see TEACHER'S MAN-
UAL, supra note 37. '° Compared to the Oral Argument Grading Sheets of the Jessup Moot Court 
2006] EFFECTIVE ORAL AJWUMENT SKILLS 883 
Rewarding style over substance may also result from 
widely misunderstood instructions given to judges. Obviously, 
advocates should not win or lose as a result of being assigned 
the weaker substantive side of an argument. 81 As a result, 
judges are typically instructed not to decide the case on the 
merits. 82 Judges may interpret that to mean they should 
judge the case on the advocates' style. Instead, they ought to 
judge on the intellectual content of the argument. An effective 
advocate can make a stronger case out of a weak position than 
a less adept advocate. 83 
The second lesson that I take from the anecdote recounted 
above is that many student-run programs reward style as 
well. Students who have done well in many programs do so 
because of style, rather than substance. 84 In selecting their 
successors to run the next year's program, the student board 
is likely to favor people like themselves. No doubt, the student 
advocate whom I described above became a board member 
and, given his view of advocacy, would almost certainly select 
similar advocates to represent the school in the future. 
The anecdote also suggests that, even though law schools 
have upgraded their programs, the quality of oral advocacy 
Competition, Traynor Moot Court Competition, Thomas Tang Moot Court Competi-
tion, and BYU Law School, Case Western Law School, and University of San 
Diego Law School course grade sheets for oral argument (on file with author). 
81 See Hernandez, supra note 62, at 75 (stating that "[a] truly bad case de-
serves to lose given the law and facts . It is hardly admirable for attorneys to 
pursue , much less win , cases that can lead to a miscarriage of justice and ever-
increasing cynicism among the publi c."). 
82 See Niagara Moot Court Tournament 2003-2004 Official Rules 23 (2003), 
http://www .la w .case.ed u/student _l ife/journals/can ada _ us/new/2003-04%20 
NiagaraRules.doc (te lling judges that "scoring should not reflect the actual merits 
of the case but only the advocacy skill and legal analysis of the participant.") 
(last visited Feb. 23, 2006); see also Kozinski , supra note 62, at 181-82. 
83 Kozinski , supra note 62, at 196 (arguing that moot court competitions 
should be judged on the merits because even a bad case can be advanced, or at 
leas t a bad outcome mitigated , by a good advocate). 
.. Judges who select the top advocates are likely to overvalue style, not sub-
stance. Rewarding substance requires a thorough understanding of the legal issues 
in th e case. Given the limited amount of time that many judges, often young 
lawyer s, have to devote to preparing to judg e, many of them simply lack that 
kind of thorough familiarity with the merits of the case . 
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has not improved at the same rate partially because the judg-
es come from the old tradition. Interscholastic competitions 
have proliferated 85 and it is hard to find volunteers to serve 
as judges for moot court programs and competitions. 86 Find-
ing qualified judges, even for otherwise prestigious competi-
tions, is a challenge. Within a legal community, moot court 
programs are likely to have their best success in soliciting 
young lawyers to serve as judges. Among young lawyers, those 
most likely to agree to serve as judges are those who have 
been involved in their alma mater's moot court program. Old 
habits die hard. Not surprisingly, my former student remained 
active in the program after he began practicing law. Lawyers 
who were part of a student run program are likely to share 
the values of that program. Despite upgrades in its program, 
those judges will select as winners advocates who resemble 
themselves . They will also deliver critiques to the advocates 
that are likely to reinforce bad habits. No doubt, that perpetu-
ates a system that values style over substance. 
The anecdote suggests a third problem with traditional 
moot court programs and competitions. The judge's questions 
flustered the student advocate. After each question, he tried to 
go back to his argwnent. But the judge would not accept glib 
answers to his questions. In fairness to the student, because of 
the judge's expertise, the judge had a far greater understand-
ing of the legal issue than did most of the other judges. But 
the questions went to the core of the legal issue and his insis-
85 Based on a survey of In ternet sites, there are at least fifty national moot 
court competitions running currently, at least eleven of them have been running 
for fifteen years or less (on file with author). 
86 Various schools routinely solicit alumni to be judges via their web sites and 
competitions solicit bar association members, alumni of the sponsoring schools, 
and local judges. See, e.g., UCLA Moot Court Honors Program, Judge Information 
(2005), http://www.law.ucla.edu/moot/judges/judge _home_page.htm (last visited Feb. 
23, 2006); Stanford Law School Alumni , Volunteering for the Law School (2005), 
http://www.law.stanford.edu/alumni/volunteer/teach .html (last visited Feb . 23, 2006); 
Northwestern University School of Law, Volunteering (2004), http://www.law. 
northwestern .edu/volunteers (last visited Feb. 23 , 2006 ); American University 
Washington College of Law, Inter-American Human Rights Moot Court Competi-
tion (2002), http ://www.wcl.ame rican.edu/humright/mcourt/2002/judges .cfm (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2006 ). 
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tence reflected that he was not satisfied with the student's 
answers. Because the questions did raise critical weaknesses 
in the advocate's position, the student should have been pre-
pared to answer them. 87 
Many student advocates return to canned answers be-
cause, given the poor quality of judging, glib answers are often 
sufficient. 88 Further, many in the moot court business advo-
cate that stratagem . I have listened to countless critiques in 
which judges tell advocates that their job is to control the 
argument. Judges are often explicit in advising that, when the 
questioning gets tough, the advocate should segue back into 
her main points. 89 But students interpret this as an invita-
tion to divert the court's attention and return to their presen-
tation. Students often come away from their moot court expe-
rience believing the goal of oral argument is for them to give 
their presentation, not to address the court's concerns. 90 
Indeed, even some otherwise credible texts on advocacy 
contribute to this state of affairs. Many texts state that oral 
advocates should develop a clear theme. 91 But the authors' 
• 1 See ORAL ADVOCACY, supra note 45, at 171 (arguing that an effective advo-
cate will anticipate and prepare responses to his or her opponent's best points 
and issues that may trouble the judges): see also FREDERICK, supra note 8 
("[V]irtually every great advocate will devote a substantial portion of time to 
thinking of as many questions as possible about the record, the parties' positions, 
the opponent's arguments, the cases, the statutory and regulatory context, and 
the policies underlying the advocated rule.") . 
•• See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text. 
•• See FREDERICK, supra note 8, at 90 (challenging the advocate "to anticipate 
opportunities . . . to segue from questions designed to probe weak points in the 
case back to affirmative points that persuade the court of the soundness of the 
position being pressed."). See generally ALDISERT, supra note 45, at 373 (quoting 
Justice John M. Walker, Jr., in response to a question of how to deal with a 
single judge who is bombarding you with questions you feel are irrelevant) ("Say, 
'I want to answer your question but then turn to the other critical points, (x) and 
(y), raised by this appeal.' Then answer the question briefly and move rapidly to 
(x) and (y). Then hope that this maneuver works. "); id. at 375 (quoting Justice 
Douglas H . Ginsburg) ("(Al lawyer should answer the question as succinctly and 
briefly as possible. Once an answer as (sic) been provided, the lawyer should 
immediately go back to his argument and continue with points he would like to 
address.") . 
•• Kozinski, supra note 62, at 187 (lamenting that students think speaking is 
so important that they will cut off the judges' questions). 
91 See ALAN D . HORNSTEIN, APPELLATE ADVOCACY IN A NUTSHELL 11 (2d ed. 
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examples often suggest that oral argument is more theatrical 
than substantive. One commonly cited example of a good 
theme is the late Johnnie Cochran's famous line in his closing 
argument to the jury in People v. Simpson: "if the glove does-
n't fit, you must acquit." 92 As a theme for a jury trial, 
Cochran's phrase was brilliant, but it fails as a theme for an 
argument to a judge. Judges are more skeptical than are ju-
ries and have more time to reflect on the merits of a case and 
more experience in sorting out legally relevant material. 93 
Advising student advocates to model their themes on examples 
like Cochran's suggests that oral argument is a show where 
cleverness and glibness are more important than substance. 
For many years when I directed McGeorge's Appellate 
Advocacy program, I participated in our orientation program 
for incoming students by setting up a mock oral argument. 
Inevitably, after watching the judges grill the advocates, stu-
dents in the audience asked why the judges did not allow the 
advocates to give their prepared presentations. Questions like 
that are understandable from novices but they reflect a more 
general problem: too many participants in traditional moot 
court continue to believe that the goal is for the advocates to 
give presentations. That kind of thinking leads to bad advoca-
cy. 
As developed above, many schools have upgraded their 
moot court offerings, yet judges still lament the poor advocacy 
skills of many lawyers appearing before them. I have argued 
why that may be. In the next subsection, I want to explore 
another reason why oral advocacy skills are still lacking. Four 
words sum it up: kinder, gentler law schools. 
1998) ("Perhaps the most important and helpful rhetorical device for effective 
appellate advocacy is the argument's theme-the phrase that pays."); see also 
ORAL ADVOCACY, supra note 45, at 191 (showing that a central theme "provides 
strength and focus to the argument"). 
9' See HORNSTEIN, supra note 91, at 16-16 (quoting Johnnie Cochran) . 
93 See FREDERICK, supra note 8, at 142 (stating that without the substance 
underlying the theme, "the advocate has no case," no matter how clever the 
theme is); see also ORAL ADVOCACY, supra note 45, at 151 ("Judges are usually 
intelligent and experienced, and are rarely impressed by slick contentions. Only a 
logical argument, backed by sincere belief, is likely to persuade them."). 
2006] EFFECTNE ORAL AR.GUMENT SKILLS 
B. Effective Oral Advocacy and the "Kinder," 
Gentler Law School 
887 
Understanding the inverse correlation between effective 
advocacy skills and today's kinder, gentler law schools re-
quires an examination of what judges and critics of traditional 
moot court programs find objectionable about the canned, slick 
presentations that so many advocates give and that often lead 
to success in competitions . To make the point, one must ask 
why oral advocacy matters and then compare moot and real 
arguments to see how different they are. 
Oral advocacy matters because it is the only opportunity 
that counsel has to talk directly to the decision-maker in the 
case. 94 In many courts, judges have read the briefs submitted 
by counsel and may have prepared a tentative ruling. 95 Of-
ten, attorneys read the court's opinion and are frustrated that 
the judges misunderstood the case. Oral argument is the op-
portunity to correct misunderstandings and to address the 
judges' concerns. 96 
Prior to oral argument, judges have had the chance to 
read counsel's brief, in which she should have developed her 
best arguments. As a result, oral argument may influence the 
court's decision in relatively few cases. 97 But the way in 
•• See ALDISERT, supra note 45, at 32 (stating that oral argument "is the only 
opportunity of the lawyer to face the court eyeball to eyeball without 'filtering' by 
the law clerks"); FREDERICK, supra note 8, at 3 ("Ordinarily, [oral argument) is 
[an advocate's) only chance to stand face to face with the court and plead their 
case directly without the filter of a written brief."); see also ORAL ADVOCACY, 
supra note 45, at 152 (discussing oral argument as the "single opportunity to 
address the decisionmakers face-to-face"). 
95 See ALDISERT, supra note 45, at 305 (recounting that the author's practice 
is to reach a tentative decision after reading the briefs, but before oral argu-
ment); id. at 309 (quoting Judge Carlos F. Lucero as saying that he comes to a 
"preliminary opinion" after reading the briefs) . 
•• See HORNSTEIN, supra note 91, at 277 (stating that the goal of oral argu-
ment is "to dispel any uncertainties and clarify any doubts about the correctness 
of one's position."); see also ORAL ADVOCACY, supra note 45, at 194 (suggesting 
that because "[m]istaken impressions may result from reading the cold, written 
page," the advocate should use oral argument "to clear up misunderstandings"). 
91 GABRIEL & POWELL, supra note 12, at 7-7 ("[J]udges estimate that oral 
argument may alter the outcome in no more than 10 percent of the cases ar-
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which an advocate can change the court's mind is by going to 
the heart of the case: recognizing the weaknesses in the 
advocate's position and the judges' concerns about the case. 
The advocate's role is to help the judges resolve those difficul-
ties. 98 The only way that counsel can help the court is by en-
gaging in a dialogue with the bench. 99 
Style may help an advocate by demonstrating that she is 
open to questions from the court. Thus, eye contact and other 
principles of good speaking will invite questions from the 
bench. 100 But a nice style is only peripheral. What matters is 
the attorney's ability to answer the court's questions 
thoroughly. 101 
Commentators are uniform on the components of good 
oral argument: counsel needs to present a clear opening, pro-
viding a roadmap of her argument, including signposts that 
signal the different components of the argument. 102 Counsel 
gued"); Paul R. Michel, Effective Appellate Advocacy, 4 LITIG., Summer 1998, at 
19, 21 (stating that as a federal circuit judge, "oral argument causes (the author} 
to reverse [his) inclination in only about one of five cases," but it could influence 
his vote in about half of all cases); see also Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 567-68 
("As between briefing and argument, there is near-universal agreement among 
federal appellate judges that the brief is more important . . . In some federal 
circuits the brief is all the court will receive in a high percentage of appeals."). 
98 See Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 569 (stating that oral argument can "give 
counsel a chance to satisfy the court on matters the judges think significant, 
issues the judges might puzzle over in chambers, and resolve less satisfactorily 
without counsel's aid"); Michel, supra note 97, at 22 ("Oral argument can win 
cases when counsel effectively answers questions. Effective answers are direct, 
dispassionate, specific and candid."). 
99 See Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 569 ("Oral argument, at its best , is an ex-
change of ideas about the case, a dialogue or discussion between court and coun-
sel."). 
100 See BEAZLEY, supra note 45 , at 193 (directing that an advocate should 
"maintain eye contact so that [he) can see any nonverbal signals that one of the 
judges has a question ."); ORAL ADVOCACY, supra note 45 , at 168 ("Eye contact 
establishes rapport and enables you to communicate conviction."). 
101 See ALDISERT , supra note 45, at 357 ("Ultimately, judges are interested in 
what you say; not how you said it. [Judges) are not out there judging a debate or 
a law school moot court competition. [They) have asked for oral argument because 
[they) need a little more substantive help from the lawyers, not an Oscar-worthy 
performance."); Michel, supra note 97, at 22 ("Success seldom depends on elo-
quence. It turns instead on anticipating the inevitable, skeptical questions, and 
preparing effective answers."). 
1°" See BEAZLEY, supra note 45, at 189 (discussing the advantages of present-
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should develop a theme wherever possible that unites her 
several arguments. 103 The attorney should aim for a flexible 
style that allows her to move to the part of the argument that 
most concerns the court. 104 Real judges want help writing 
their opinions and need to understand, if they are leaning 
towards the attorney's position, how to overcome legitimate 
weaknesses in the case. 105 Counsel must prepare in advance 
to answer hard questions about her position. 106 Counsel 
must never put off answering the court's questions; instead, 
ing a roadmap of the points to be covered); ORAL ADVOCACY, supra note 45, at 
183 (arguing that oral argument should contain an overview, which uses signposts 
that help "the court understand the direction of the argument."); FREDERICK, su-
pra note 8, at 20 ("[T]he opening should signpost for the court the two to four 
points the advocate hopes to make, using phrases the advocate hopes will be 
memorable to the court ."). 
103 See BEAZLEY, supra note 45, at 191 ("Having a theme in mind can help you 
keep the [c]ourt focused on the reason for a decision in your favor. Frequently, 
when questions have led you away from the point of your argument, you can 
recover by returning to your theme."); FREDERICK, supra note 8, at 84 (talking 
about the "mantra" as "a phrase or sentence to repeat several times so that it 
becomes the theme of the argument.") . As discussed above, too often students 
choose themes that are more suitable to jury trials than to appellate arguments. 
Judges can see through slick themes. Instead, the theme should have real sub-
stance that holds together upon closer scrutiny. ORAL ADVOCACY, supra note 45 , 
191-93. 
1°' FREDERICK BERNAYS WIENER, EFFECTIVE APPELLATE ADVOCACY 183-84 
(Christopher T. Lutz & William Pannill eds., rev . ed. 2004) ("Counsel must ... 
be sufficiently flexible to vary his argument on the basis of the reception it re-
ceives."); see also ALDISERT, supra note 45, at 364. 
106 See generally FREDERICK, supra note 8, at 5 ("Members of the [Supreme] 
[C]ourt themselves can be quite explicit about using oral argument to flesh out 
issues that shape the opinion."); Laurence H. Silberman, From the Bench: Plain 
Talk on Appellate Advocacy, 20 LITIG., Spring 1994, at 3, 60 ("Skilled advocacy 
improves the quality of our decisions . . . . The better the lawyers, on both sides 
of a case, the more likely it is that a judge will arrive at, or at least come close 
to, the right answer."); Karen J. Williams, Help Us Help You: A Fourth Circuit 
Primer on Effective Appellate Oral Arguments, 50 S.C . L. REV. 591, 599 (1999) 
("The questions from the bench are the only indication of what issues are bother-
ing the judges and may clue you in on what is preventing them from seeing the 
case your way."). 
106 See Williams, supra note 105, at 595 ("To be thoroughly prepared for oral 
argument, you need to . . . begin thinking about your appeal from . . . where you 
ended in the briefs . Identify those points of law upon which the outcome of the 
case is likely to turn and which, when viewed objectiv ely, could be resolved in 
favor of either party."). 
890 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 75 
she should give a direct "yes" or "no" answer and then seek to 
elaborate on her answer. 107 Failing to do so causes counsel to 
miss the opportunity to persuade the court. Further, counsel 
must be fully candid with the court. Misstating the facts or 
the law leads to a loss of the credibility that is so invaluable 
in getting the court to accept one's legal position. 108 
Successful oral advocates should try to use the court's 
questions to their advantage . In that sense, an oral advocate 
should try to control the argument; if an advocate can success-
fully understand the weakness of her case and thus anticipate 
the judges' concerns, she can explain why her case can win 
nonetheless. 109 She can do so only if she listens carefully to 
the questions and understands the law and the facts. Un-
doubtedly, counsel cannot anticipate all of the judges' ques-
tions; however, through preparation cousel should be able to 
anticipate most questions and have thoughtful answers. 110 If 
counsel's argument really has fatal flaws to which she cannot 
respond, one wonders why the case is before the court at all. 
On the premise that the case is not frivolous, successful coun-
sel should be able to deal with the weakest part of her 
case. 111 
107 See id. at 599 ("Respond immediately to a question with a 'yes,' 'no,' 'it 
depends,' or 'I don't know.' Follow the short answer with a concise explanation 
and citation to the record or precedent as necessary."); see also BEAZLEY, supra 
note 45, at 194 ("The court will be much better able to listen to your explanation 
if you first satisfy the court's need for an answer to its question."). 
108 See ORAL ADVOCACY, supra note 45, at 186; FREDERICK, supra note 8, at 
150 ("The worst sin of all is knowingly to mis-cite authority to a court or to take 
a snippet in an opinion and represent that as the holding of the court." These 
types of errors "can detract from the substance of the argument and diminish the 
credibility of the advocate in the eyes of the court."). 
109 See ALDISERT, supra note 45, at 360 (remarking that "you, not your oppo-
nent, must control the direction of your argument," and to that end the advocate 
must mention adverse facts and case law "up front and tell [the court] why they 
do not hurt you."); ORAL ADVOCACY, supra note 45, at 195 (suggesting that when 
dealing with "[q]uestions that reveal troubling issues .... [y]ou must prepare ... 
by considering weaknesses in advance and planning the best possible responses"). 
" 0 See ORAL ADVOCACY, supra note 45, at 171; FREDERICK, supra note 8, at 
62-64 (reminding advocates to "identify [their] opponent's best points." Try to 
think of issues that may trouble the judges "and then create arguments for these 
points and rehearse the responses."). 
111 See Kenety, supra note 64 (''Practicing attorneys will often discuss the 
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No doubt, effective oral argument includes other skills. 
Developing a compelling conclusion that summarizes the most 
persuasive points in the argument is one such skill, as is the 
ability to deliver an effective rebuttal. 112 But engaging the 
court in a dialogue during which counsel effectively addresses 
the court's concerns is the primary tool of the successful oral 
advocate .113 
Implicit in the discussion above is the fact that success in 
moot court differs from success in real arguments . 114 Style 
counts too much in moot court arguments, whereas the ability 
to answer hard questions counts most of all in real arguments. 
Student advocates often believe that controlling the argument 
means avoiding hard questions and getting back to their 
canned arguments. m Grading criteria in student competi-
tions may even reward an advocate's ability to get through 
major arguments. 116 Student advocates avoid making conces-
sions, despite the fact that real judges expect sensible conces-
sions.117 
Student advocates may fall back on style, apart from the 
lessons that they are taught in their moot court programs, 118 
weakest points in their own case because they know this is where they have to 
convince the court if they are to prevail."); see also ALD!SERT, supra note 45, at 
317 (quoting Third Circuit Chief Justice Edward R. Becker, "Acknowledge the 
vulnerable points in your position and then tell the [c)ourt how to deal with 
them ."); id. at 323 (quoting Second Circuit Justice Roger J . Miner quoting Law-
rence Wallace, "If you can't answer the question , 'What are the strongest points 
to be made for the other side?' you're not really prepared to argue the case ."). 
m BEAZLEY, supra note 45, at 192, 195-96; ORAL ADVOCACY, supra note 45 , 
198-201. 
113 See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
"' See supra notes 69-96 and accompanying text . 
116 TEACHER'S MANUAL, supra note 37, at 31; see also Ginsburg, supra note 7 
("Questions should not be resented as intrusions into a well-planned lecture ."). 
11
• See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
117 See ALDISERT, supra note 45, at 369 (arguing that concessions can serve 
two goals . First, concessions can help avoid wasting time arguing over trivial 
points . Second, concessions planned out during preparation will be better thought 
out .); FREDERICK, supra note 8, at 59 (stating "A skillfully made concession 
. . . can make the advocate more credible to the court by demonstrating the rea-
sonableness of the advocate's position. "). 
118 See supra Part II(a ). 
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because answering questions is difficult. 119 Hence even if a 
law school has in place an effective advocacy program, stu-
dents need more experience in the kind of flexible interchange 
that produces good oral argument. 
That begs the question of how else law schools might 
teach this all important skill. In considering this question, I 
offer my own experience. When I went to law school, the only 
required advocacy course was a first year legal writing course 
taught by upper level students. During the second semester, a 
classmate and I submitted a joint brief and gave a mock argu-
ment to a panel of upper level students. Beyond that, moot 
court was an extracurricular activity. I learned something 
about advocacy in the program, but I am not sure how much. 
Shortly after graduating from law school, I served as 
counsel in cases before federal district courts in Philadelphia, 
New Orleans, and before the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit. In thinking about my experience, I ques-
tion how I was able to function as an effective oral advocate. 
As unpleasant as I found the Socratic method as a stu-
dent , 120 I concluded that I had learned invaluable lessons 
119 Kenety, supra note 64, at 584 ("Law students often dread questions for fear 
they may not be able to answer them."). 
120 I memorialized my views of Jaw school in a letter that I wrote to Professor 
Roland Pennock at Swarthmore College. Professor Pennock was organizing a panel 
discussion on Jaw school and he solicited views from those of us currently in law 
school. On February 20, 1973, I wrote , in part: 
The transition from [high school] teaching to being a student was not 
very easy: teaching provided me with frequent and positive feedback ; the 
result of my energy was measurable in human growth; being a first year 
law student is a hazing . . . . Because you want to counsel undergrad-
uates and do not anticipate changing the law school atmosphere, you 
might make students aware of th e intensity of the competitive environ-
ment and of the limited success that is built into the system (few ex-
ams; the majority of grades deferred until June ; training in the Socratic 
method which is aimed at [stripping] down inefficient thinking and re-
building minds in a new shape • a device frequently used to embarrass, 
if not humiliate, first year students; the ten percent cut off point for 
Law Review which leaves many striving and ambitio[us] and bright 
students feeling like failures). 
Letter from Professor Michael Vitiello, Professor of Law at The University of the 
Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to Professor Roland Pennock, Professor Emeritus 
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about oral advocacy through the rigorous grilling that my best 
professors provided. 121 
An effective Socratic dialogue is an invaluable tool to 
teach advocacy skills. A professor's questions ought to be simi-
lar to those that a judge would ask an attorney. Good law 
professors and judges expect answers to be responsive. The 
Socratic dialogue should teach students the importance of 
listening to questions and framing thoughtful answers. Stu-
dents should realize that their answers will in turn inspire fol-
low up questions and that they must be able to think through 
the implications of their answers. 122 Like oral argument 
where judges ask probing questions to bring out the specific 
issues in the case, 123 a classroom discussion should focus on 
the strengths and weaknesses of different legal positions. 
Students in law school today are far less likely than stu-
dents in my generation to receive a similarly rigorous 
education. 124 That is so because the Socratic method has 
been under attack for over thirty years and, although clear 
empirical evidence is unavailable, professors today are almost 
certainly more likely to use a modified, less demanding So-
of Political Science at Swarthmore College (on file with author). 
121 Vitiello, supra note 14, at 971. 
122 Cf FREDERICK, supra note 8, at 59 (stating that a "critical dimension to the 
court's decision-making process is understanding the likely consequences that will 
flow from its ruling" and thus an effective advocate must be able to answer hypo-
thetical questions that test "the parameters of the applicable rule"). 
123 In an exercise sponsored by the ABA, Justice Stephen Breyer, then a judge 
for the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit , discussed his expec-
tations of lawyers during oral argument. Videotape: Effective Arguments to the 
Court : Arguments to the Supreme Court, Tape 3 (A.B.A. Consortium for Profes-
sional Education and the Section of Litigation 1999). Justice Breyer explained 
that he relies on oral argument to discover "the lawyer's characterization of the 
issue from their point of view." Id . He also stated: 
Id . 
[W]e've read the briefs, we're trying to think about the issues in the 
case .. . . And the lawyers, although they want to win for their clients, 
we feel they are there to help us, and therefore by trying to get these 
questions out , there's something either that is really bothering me or I 
want to use the best argument of the other side to elicit the response. 
124 Robert M. Lloyd , Hard Law Firms and Soft Law Schools, 83 N.C. L. REV . 
667, 681-84 (2005) (discussing th e decline of the Socra tic method in law schools ). 
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cratic teaching method than did the previous generation of 
law professors. 125 
Commentators have leveled numerous attacks on the 
Socratic Method. For example, one study concluded that "the 
Socratic method alienates, oppresses, traumatizes and silences 
women." 126 Some critics argue that the method is ineffective 
for all students because it "fails to prepare the student for 
work as an attorney" 127 and suggest that it may be responsi-
ble for lawyers' incompetence 128 and incivility. 129 Further, 
critics allege that it causes students to become cynical: the So-
cratic method and other traditional techniques "set students' 
moral compasses adrift on a sea of relativism, in which all 
positions are viewed as 'defensible' or 'arguable' and none as 
'right' or 'just.'" 130 In effect, the Socratic method leads to 
moral numbing. As summarized by one writer, the Socratic 
method is "infantilizing, demeaning, dehumanizing, sadistic" 
and "destructive of positive ideological values." 131 
126 Id. at 681 ("The traditional Socratic method ... has vanished from Ameri-
can law schools."). 
126 Jennifer L. Rosato, The Socratic Method and Women Law Students: Human-
ize, Don't' Feminize, 7 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 37, 38 (1997). 
127 Ronald Chester & Scott E. Alumbaugh, Functionalizing First-Year Legal 
Education: Toward a New Pedagogical Jurisprudence, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 21, 
24 (1991). 
12• See Stropus, supra note 14, at 460-62 (discussing the allegations that the 
Socratic method fails to prepare students to practice); Rodney J. Uphoff et al., 
Preparing the New Law Graduate to Practice Law: A View From the Trenches, 65 
U. CIN. L. REV 381, 391 (1997) (quoting a recent graduate stating that the So-
cratic method did not teach him what to do in court). 
129 Paul T. Hayden, Applying Client Lawyer Models in Legal Education, 21 
LEGAL STUD. F. 301, 303 (1997) (positing that students emulate their professors 
behavior and "(al Kingsfieldian professor, for example, may send the message to 
students that the super-competent lawyer is brusque, dominating, and often con-
descending to those less competent (a category which certainly includes clients)."); 
Roger E. Schechter, Changing Law Schools Make Less Nasty Lawyers, 21 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 367, 381 (1996) ("The rigor of the Socratic method can all too often 
slide into a dismissive or sarcastic exchange in which the teacher communicates 
an unspoken but nonetheless powerful message that rude or mean-spirited wise 
cracks, and even temper tantrums, are entirely appropriate behavior"). 
130 John Mixon & Robert P. Schuwerk, The Personal Dimension of Professional 
Responsibility, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87, 102 (1995). 
131 Alan A. Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARV. L. REV. 392, 407 
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So anathema is the Socratic method that many law 
schools now distance themselves from the historical image of 
law school and advertise themselves as "kinder and gentler," 
than the traditional law school where Professor Kingsfield, the 
archetypal law professor in The Paper Chase, roams the 
halls. 132 
The literature is replete with suggested remedies, includ-
ing allowing students to demur if called upon or giving ad-
vance notice when a professor will call upon a particular stu-
dent.133 Further, critics of the Socratic method and law 
school education generally urge that we validate our stu-
dents.134 Professors must tailor their teaching to reach the 
current generation raised on the media, with shorter attention 
spans, and less motivation than previous generations of stu-
dents.135 Critics argue that law professors ought to allow 
their students to voice their own views and not force them to 
take positions in which they do not believe. 136 
(1971). 
132 See, e.g., Casman, supra note 13; Adam Liptak, Forget Socrates, N .Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 25, 2004, at 34; Tony Mauro, All-Online Law School Challenges Pre-
cedents, USA TODAY, Oct. 12, 1999 at 6A; Linda K. Wortheimer, A Kinder Gen-
tler Law School: SMU UT Take Sharing Approach to Making 1st Year Less 
Daunting, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 13, 2001, available at http://www. 
orientation.vermontlaw.edu/asp/director.htm (last visited Feb . 26, 2006) . 
133 See Vemellia R. Randall, The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, First Year Law 
Students and Performance, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 63, 82 (1995) (suggesting professors 
give introverted students advance notice of being called on, advance notice of 
questions, or time to think before answering to improve their performance); Sarah 
E. Ricks, Some Strategies to Teach Reluctant Talkers to Talk About Law , 54 J. 
LEGAL Eouc. 570, 573 (2004) (discussing ways teachers can modify the Socratic 
method to make students more comfortable speaking in class). 
134 Gerald F. Hess, Heads and Hearts: The Teaching and Learning Environ-
ment in Law School, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 75, 79-80 (2002) (describing a teaching 
method more focused on interpersonal relationships and the emotional needs of 
the students) . 
135 See, e.g, Rogelio Lasso, From the Paper Chase to the Digital Chase: Technol-
ogy and the Challenge of Teaching 21st Century Law Students, 43 SANTA CLARA 
L. REV. 1, 3 (2002); Michael L. Richmond, Teaching Law to Passive Learners: The 
Contemporary Dilemma of Legal Education, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 943, 956 (1995); 
Craig T. Smith, Synergy and Synthesis: Teaming "Socratic Method" With Comput-
ers and Data Projectors to Teach Synthesis to Beginning Law Students, 7 LEGAL 
WRITING 113, 114 (2001). 
136 Ann J. Iijima, Lessons Learned: Legal Education and Law Student 
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Measuring the extent to which law professors have re-
sponded to these criticisms by adopting gentler teaching tech-
niques is difficult. 137 Even though critics continue to rail 
against the Socratic method, 138 I suspect that many law pro-
fessors have abandoned the more demanding version of the 
Socratic method in favor of a "kinder and gentler" classroom 
style. That is a shame. 
Elsewhere, I have written extensively about the Socratic 
method and attempted to address the main criticisms leveled 
against its use. 139 Here, I want to explore the kind of teach-
ing that critics of the demanding form of the Socratic method 
propose in its place and discuss why that kind of classroom 
experience is ineffective in training students to be effective 
oral advocates. 
Judges expect precise answers from advocates. 140 They 
Dysfunction, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 524, 529 (1998) (arguing that forcing students to 
advocate for ideas they do not support leads to "moral neutering"). 
137 Stephen I. Freidland attempted to quantify how often the Socratic method 
was used in classrooms and found that most professors use a combination of 
methods. Stephen I. Freidland, How We Teach: A Survey of Teaching Techniques 
in American Law Schools, 20 SEAITLE U. L. REV. 1, 28 (1996) (explaining an 
overview of the results of his survey showing that "[t]hirty percent of those who 
used the Socratic method did so 'most of the time,' and forty.one percent used it 
'often.' Of those remaining, twenty-one percent used it 'sometimes' and only five 
percent stated that they 'rarely' used it."). This task is also made more difficult 
by the problem of identifying exactly what people mean when they use the term 
"Socratic method." See Vitiello, supra note 14, at 961-62 (discussing the various 
definitions of the term "Socratic method"). 
138 See e.g. Andrew Moore, Conversion and the Socratic Method in Legal Edu-
cation: Some Advice for Prospective Law Students, 80 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 505, 
506-509 (2004) (warning prospective law students about the dangers of the Socrat· 
ic method to their mental health); Morrison Torrey, You Call That Education?, 19 
WIS. WOMEN'S L. J. 93, 94 (2004) (stating that "mainstream legal pedagogy (es-
sentially the case method and Socratic Method) is full of flaws and, well, let's 
face it, just plain bad teaching."). 
139 Vitiello, supra note 14, at 955 (giving an overview of the criticisms of the 
Socratic method and arguing that they are not only misinformed, but that remov-
ing the Socratic method from law school harms students and leaves them less 
prepared for the challenges of the legal profession). 
140 See ALDISERT, supra note 45, at 318. Justice Deanell Reece Tacha of the 
Tenth Circuit stated: 
The most common failing I see in both oral argument and brief writing 
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care little about the personal views of attorneys appearing 
before them and even less about their feelings. Judges may 
bruise an advocate's ego when the advocate's performance is 
inadequate. 141 In making a classroom too "kind," a law pro-
fessor may create the impression that careless thinking meets 
the lawyer's professional responsibility . In such a setting, the 
professor loses an opportunity to introduce her students to the 
realistic demands of the practice oflaw .142 
Apart from the missed opportunity to acclimate students 
to the demands of the courtroom and law practice general-
Id . 
is the failure to be analytically precise about the issues addressed on 
appeal. . . . The most common complaints I hear from appellate judges 
relate to . .. lack of focus, covering too many issues , and scattering case 
authority and facts throughout the brief and argument so that they lose 
their impact on the issues to which they are most germane . 
141 The lack of concern for an attorney's feelings was demonstrated by a letter 
from United States District Court Judge William Harold Cox, a notorious segrega-
tionist, to John Doar , the head of the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Depart-
ment during the early 1960s and upon whom Gene Hackman 's character in the 
movie, MISSISSIPPI BURNING , was based. See generally Douglas 0 . Linder, Bending 
Toward Justice: John Doar and the "Mississippi Burning" Trial, 72 MISS . L. J. 
731 (2002). No doubt, this is an extreme example, but the letter illustrates the 
kind of attitude lawyers may have to face: 
Dear Mr . Doar, 
I have a copy of your letter of October 12 . . . [I] thought I had made it 
clear to you .. . that I was not in the least impressed with your impru-
dence in reciting the chronology of the case before me with which I am 
completely familiar. If you need to build such transcripts for your boss 
man , you had better do that by interoffice memoranda because I am not 
favorably impressed with you or your tactics in undertaking to push one 
of your cases before me. I spend most of my time fooling with lousy 
cases brought before me by your department in the civil rights field, and 
I do not intend to tum my docket over to your department for your 
political advancement .... You are completely stupid if you do not fully 
realize that each of the judges in this court understands the importance 
of this case to all litigants. I do not intend to be hurried or harassed by 
you or any of your underlings in this or any court where I sit and the 
sooner you get that through your head the better you will get along 
with me, if that is of any interest to you. . . . 
Id. at 755-56. 
142 See Stropus, supra note 14, at 472 (emphasizing the loss to law students 
from teachers and schools that do not use the Socratic method to teach students 
to think analytically) . 
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ly, 143 the professor who allows students to state their own 
views for fear of moral numbing, by forcing them to support 
positions contrary to their own values, disserves his students. 
Implicit in the discussion about the appropriate solicitation of 
students' personal views is that much of a classroom discus-
sion is devoted to individuals' value choices. 144 That suggests 
a misuse of the classroom. 
The failure to have students argue positions that they do 
not believe in amounts to educational malpractice. As I have 
stated elsewhere, "[t]he most important feature of a legal 
education is that it challenges our views and forces us to ex-
amine them with care. "145 Students must be able to argue 
those positions because lawyers must be able to anticipate and 
rebut their opponents' arguments. A lawyer who lacks that 
skill cannot adequately represent her clients .146 Further, stu-
dents ought to recognize the reality that advocating a position 
" 3 Even if a person chooses not to be a litigator, she will need oral advocacy 
skills in many other settings as well. Judges expect their law clerks to present 
competing arguments to help the judge decide how to vote. A senior partner ex· 
pects a junior associate to explain the law concisely to the partner and perhaps 
to the client. A transactional lawyer must make presentations to clients and to 
counsel representing the other side in the transaction. 
,... Gerald Hess, a leading advocate of the "kinder, gentler law schoolt sug-
gests using student interests and ideas to build the class. He quotes his students 
complaining that their views are not included: 
We've come across some cases where race was an issue or women's 
rights should have been an issue and we could have fleshed it out more . 
Some people might look at that as getting sidetracked. But we also have 
to understand that we are learning law in a vacuum, but when we get 
out in the real world we are dealing with people who are not the same 
color, that are not the same gender and religion or sexual orientat ion. 
And we need to learn to deal with that effectively . 
Hess, supra note 134, at 100 (quoting a student interviewee). Professor Hess also 
advocates allowing students some role in designing the course, from choosing 
coursework to designing the evaluation method. Id . at 97-98. 
145 Vitiello, supra note 14, at 997; see generally Elizabeth Garrett, Becoming 
Lawyers: The Role of Socratic Method in Modern Law Schools, 1 GREEN BAG 2d 
199, 202; Patricia Mell, Taking Socrates' Pulse: Does the Socratic Method Ha ve 
Continuing Validity in 2002?, 81 MICH. Bus . L.J. 46, 46 (2002); see also Phillip E. 
Areeda, The Socratic Method, Lecture at Puget Sound (Jan. 31, 1990), in 109 
HARV. L. REV. 911, 917-18 (1996). 
,.a Vitiello, supra note 14, at 997. 
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contrary to her own beliefs may be necessary as part of her 
professional responsibility to advocate zealously on behalf of 
her client . 147 
Other problems exist when law professors solicit students' 
views. Envision a class in which the professor is teaching the 
law of rape. Soliciting students' views may invite the expres-
sion of some boorish, hurtful points of view .148 But even 
more importantly , the solicitation of students' views is dis-
tracting from the core function of the classroom. If professors 
are using the classroom to educate lawyers, professors ought 
to ask for legally relevant arguments and demand carefully 
focused answers, the kinds of answers that judges expect dur-
ing oral argument. 149 I have found that students often inter-
pret a question about their views of the case as an invitation 
to talk about feelings and positions that are only tangentially 
related to the subject at hand. 
Teaching the relevance of mistake as to consent in rape 
cases offers an illustration. Courts have divided on the law 
governing the relevance of a man's mistake of fact as to the 
woman's consent. 15° Followin g the advice laid out above, a 
m See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L. CONDUCT PREAMBLE (2006). The Preamble 
states: 
Id. 
In the nature of law practice, however, conflicting responsibilities are 
encountered. . . . Such issues must be resolved through the exercise of 
sensitive professional and moral judgment guided by the basic principles 
underlying the Rules . These principles include the lawyer's obligation 
zealously to protect and pursue a client's legitimate interests, within the 
bounds of the law, while maintaining a professional , courteous and civil 
attitude toward all persons involved in the legal system . 
148 See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Teaching Rape Law, 102 YALE L.J. 509, 509 (1992) ; 
James J . Tomkovicz , On Teaching Rape : Reasons, Risks, and Rewards , 102 YALE 
L.J . 481, 481 (2002). 
''" See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text. 
150 That issue was before the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts on 
several occasions. See Commonwealth v. Ascolillo, 541 N.E.2d 570, 575 (Mass . 
1989) (upholding the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury that an honest and 
reasonable mistake as to consent was a defense to rape ); Commonwealth v. Sher-
ry, 437 N .E.2d 224, 233 (Mass. 1982) (rejecting a claim that an honest but unrea-
sonable mistake that the victim consent negated the mens rea of rape) . Cf. Regi-
na v. Morgan , (1976) A.C . 183 (H.L.) (holding that a good faith mistake negates 
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professor might ask for students to express their views on the 
subject. No doubt, the professor can generate a freewheeling 
discussion with some interesting points. In my experience, 
much of the discussion will be off the point and will fail to 
reinforce the need for rigorous analysis of precise legal issues. 
When I taught the issue of consent, I had to push stu-
dents hard to see that the relevance of mistake of fact has 
long standing roots in the criminal law, that the courts needed 
to interpret language in the rape statute, and that the effect of 
one interpretation might be to make the crime of rape a strict 
liability offense, despite the grading of the punishment as a 
crime of violence. 151 Long before I considered opening up the 
discussion to students' personal views, I found that I had to 
devote a great deal of time simply getting students to expli-
cate the holdings of the cases and to see the very real differ-
ence between the results of following one rule as opposed to 
another . Many students would prefer to talk in broad theo-
retical terms about feminist theory and power relationships. It 
takes far less time and effort to form those kinds of opinions 
than it does to do the close reading and careful exegesis of the 
courts' opinions. But professors miss the opportunity to teach 
the essential skills needed for effective oral advocacy when 
they allow students to spend too much time discussing their 
views as opposed to legal analysis and reasoning. 
Open-ended discussion of students' personal views may be 
affirming for students but it fails to focus the discussion and 
thereby fails to train them in critical oral advocacy skills. 152 
the required mens rea) (U.K.). 
151 Compare State v. Christensen, 414 N.W.2d 843, 846 (Iowa App. 1987) (hold-
ing that because prior case law had established that "a defendant's knowledge of 
his or her partner's lack of consent is not an element" of the crime of rape , it 
follows that "a defendant's mistake of fact as to that consent would not neg ate an 
element of th e offense ."), and State v. Tague, 310 N .W.2d 209, 211 (Iowa 1981) 
(holding that despite the general disfavor of strict liability offenses, "[sJtatutes 
regarding sex offenses are common examples of employment of strict liability 
intended to protect the public welfare."), with People v. Mayberry , 15 Cal. 3d 143, 
155 (1975) (arguing that the legislature most likely did not intend rape to be a 
strict liability offense because of the severe penalty and "serious loss of reputation 
following conviction"). 
1• 2 Without knowing how this lawyer was taught, this excerpt from the oral 
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Thus, affirming students may also be inappropriate for a sec-
ond reason: too much concern about affirming students invites 
tolerance of superficiality. For example, even advocates of the 
gentler classroom who want to avoid embarrassing students, 
also recognize the importance of setting high academic stan-
dards.153 A professor who adheres to the modern view of a 
gentler classroom and who invites freewheeling discussions of 
students' personal views may err on the side of allowing poor 
legal arguments in an effort to avoid hurting students' feel-
ings. 
A professor like Kingsfield showed no hesitation to bruise 
the ego of his students when they made poor legal argu-
ments. 154 Critics have railed against the Kingsfields of the 
world for such boorish behavior .155 But allowing students to 
make poorly reasoned arguments does not serve them or their 
future clients well. For example, in The Paper Chase, Profes-
sor Kingsfield shows little patience with Mr. Bell when Mr. 
argument in United States v. Johnson before the Seventh Circuit Court of Ap-
peals is an excellent example of practicing attorneys thinking that their views 
and arguments deserve the court's time without a legally relevant basis: 
Judge Sykes: Any way to distinguish [Caballes!? I mean I understand 
that you object to the premise . 
Lawyer : I hope you can find one . 
Judge Bauer: Well, what you want us to do is overrule the Supreme 
Court. 
Lawyer: I want you to help me distinguish it, Judge . I am very dis-
turbed . 
Judge Bauer: You can be disturbed on your own free time. Why are you 
intruding on mine? 
Oral Argument Recording: Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Public Access to Oral 
Argument Recordings, 04-2732 : USA v. Johnson, Robert Lee, available at http:// 
www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?caseno=04-2732&submit=showdkt&yr=04&num= 
2732 (last visited Feb. 23, 2006). 
153 Hess, supra note 134, at 100 (advocating the importance of setting high 
expectations so that students have something to strive for and achieve). 
164 Vitiello, supra note 14, at 998-99 (recounting a scene in The Paper Chase 
where Professor Kingsfield rebukes Mr. Bell for a weak argument and pointing 
out that teachers do their students a disservice when they do not correct wrong 
behaviors or weak arguments in school because those traits will hurt the student 
and their clients when they appear in court after graduation). 
155 Lila A. Colebum & Julia C. Spring, Socrates Unbound: Developmental Per-
spectives on the Law School Experience, 24 LAW & PSYCHOL . REV. 5, 19 (2000) . 
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Bell argues that application of the Deadman's Statute is "un-
fair . "156 Students often appeal to such basic feelings of fair-
ness in class. But leaving such "arguments" unchallenged does 
not serve students well, despite the fact that challenging such 
superficial statements may cause students to feel insecure or 
uncomfortable. Judges expect more than gut reactions. 
A primary virtue of the Socratic method is that it chal-
lenges students' views and forces them to think more deeply 
than they may have done before attending law school. 157 Be-
ing challenged may be painful; it may cause us to realize that 
we are not as smart or as well prepared as we would like to 
believe. It may make us rethink our comfortable assumptions 
about the world. But as painful as that may be, the intellectu-
al challenge posed by the rigorous application of the Socratic 
method is essential to training competent professionals. 158 
Students, like lawyers, must be able to articulate opposing 
arguments if they want to be effective advocates. If that is 
morally numbing, so be it. 
Today, I surmise that too much, not too little, time is 
spent soliciting students' views. Discussion of personal views 
may come at the expense of much more important lessons, 
including the ability to state with precision the holding and 
reasoning of complicated cases, competing arguments to the 
majority opinion, and the application of the court's ruling to 
new sets of facts. Some students may interpret the emphasis 
on the expression of personal opinions as an invitation to 
prepare poorly, because they are confident that they can talk 
about their own view of the subject rather than explicating the 
court's view. 159 By making class gentler or more fun, profes-
166 JOHN JAY OSBORN, JR., THE PAPER CHASE 127•28 (Special Anniversary ed., 
2003). 
157 Stropus, supra note 14, at 465-68 (advocating for the use of the Socratic 
method as a needed bridge between undergraduate work and working in the legal 
field). 
168 See, e.g., Stropus, supra note 14, at 470-72; Vitiello, supra note 14, at 987-
91. 
1641 As one of my upper level students said in class this past semester, when I 
asked him what the Supreme Court said, "I don't know what the Court thought, 
but what I think is . . . " 
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sors miss the opportunity to teach essential oral advocacy 
skills. 
IV. CONCLUSION: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
My argument thus far begs a question: where do we go 
from here? Many of us recognize that law schools still provide 
inadequate training in oral advocacy. 160 But simply pointing 
out the problem is not especially helpful. 
Programs like this symposium are encouraging. So too are 
clinical programs like the University of Mississippi's Criminal 
Appeals Program where faculty can teach meaningful advoca-
cy skills . But schools often limit enrollment in clinics because 
clinics require a low student to faculty ratio to guarantee 
meaningful supervision . 161 
Judges have a significant role in educating the profession 
about the need for improved oral advocacy skills . Some judges 
educate the profession through their writings about advoca-
cy .162 Many judges volunteer their time by judging moot 
court competitions. However, at least according to Judge 
Kozinski, some of them are not forthcoming with the student 
advocates but instead play right into the conceit that student 
competitions are teaching the right stuff. 163 Judges who 
share Judge Kozinski's view of moot court would do well to 
end the charade and give more meaningful criticism of student 
advocates. Were prominent judges to award top honors to the 
advocate who stayed with the judges' questions and who en-
tered into a meaningful dialogue, rather than trying to score 
debating points, and were those judges to explain their cri-
teria, competition organizers and faculty involved in moot 
court programs would get the message. 
Motivated professors can introduce oral advocacy into 
160 I do not mean to suggest that we have gone far enough in teaching other 
skills . I suspect that we still have a ways to go in improving other skills. 
141 See MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 250-51 (discussing the high costs 
of live client clinics in light of the need to provide a low faculty-to-student ratio) . 
"' 2 See generally ALDISERT, supra note 45; Ginsburg, supra note 7; Rehnquist , 
supra note 7; Wiener, supra note 7. 
163 See Kozinski , supra note 62, at 178. 
904 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 75 
their classes through the use of simulation exercises. 164 My 
own hobby horse is to provoke a dialogue in the legal academy 
about whether we have been too quick to advocate in favor of 
kinder gentler legal education. 165 At a minimum, I hope that 
professors who use the Socratic dialogue explain to their stu-
dents the essential skill that they are learning through the 
process. That explanation might make students less resistant 
to the method . 166 
These suggestions are at best incremental. For a wider 
impact, I would encourage the ABA to commission another 
study of oral advocacy training in our nation's law schools. Its 
previous study produced marked changes in advocacy pro-
grams. 167 But as indicated above, 168 law schools still have a 
way to go. Our study was necessarily limited in scope. An 
ABA study might examine programs at all accredited law 
schools. Additional resources might allow it to study more 
closely the content of the courses around the country to assess 
the quality of instruction . Among proposals that a committee 
might study is the need for mandatory oral advocacy training 
beyond the limited training now required at most schools. 
Law schools would almost certainly pay attention to an 
ABA report and many schools would likely follow recommen-
dations for upgrading advocacy training . Such an effort might 
result in better oral advocacy, with more lawyers who truly 
understand the role of oral argument and who attempt to 
engage in a meaningful dialogue with the bench. 
164 See, e.g., Myron Moskovitz, From Case Method to Problem Method: The 
Evol ution of a Teacher, 48 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1205, 1206-08 (2004); Stephen J. 
Shapiro, Teaching First Year Civil Procedure and Other Introductory Courses by 
the Problem Method, 34 CREIGHTON L. REV. 245, 254-59 (2000) (describing how 
Professor Sh apiro uses a series of problems and cases combined). 
166 Vitiello, supra note 14, at 956-58. 
160 If Planet Law School is typical, many students misunderstand the impor-
tant skill that they are learning when a professor questions them thoroughly. 
ATTICUS FALCON, ESQ., PLANET LAW SCHOOL 27-31 (1998). I certainly did not 
fully appreciate the ben efits from the experience until I began practicing law . 
Vitiello, supra note 14, at 971. 
167 See supra notes 35-60 and accompanying text. 
168 Se e supra Part III . 
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APPENDIX A 
EVALUATION SHEET FOR ORAL ARGUMENTS 
I. Substantive Content and Analysis 
A. Introduction 
1. Opening Statement 
Did you introduce yourself? 
Did you tell the court whom you represent? 
Did you tell the court the relief your client is 
requesting? 
2. Theme 
Did you start with a statement which, by 
weaving the applicable law and facts togeth-
er, tells the judge what is at stake in your 
case? 
3. Road map 
Did you give the court in a few sentences a 
brief overview of how your argument will be 
organized? 
B. Argument 
1. Opening Statement 
Did you tell the court where your client 
stands on this issue and what your client 
wants? 
2. Organization 
Did you start with the strongest argument 
and continue in a logical and comprehensive 
manner? 
3. Support of Argument 
Did you make effective use of authority, 
reasoning, and policy to support your argu-
ments? 
4. Application of Law to Fact 
Did you effectively apply the legal arguments 
to your client's situation? 
5. Response to Questions 
When the court asked a question, did you 
906 MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL 
first reply with a "yes" or "no"? 
Did you then explain your answer? 
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Did you concisely and effectively summarize 
your argument? 
1. Theme 
Did you briefly restate your theme and ex-
plain why you should win? 
2. Relief requested 
Did you state what you want the court to do? 
II . Speech and Delivery 
A. Volume 
Was the court able to hear you? 
B. Speed and Clarity 
Was your speech clear and deliberate? 
Did you vary the pace and pause occasionally? 
C. Body Language 
Did you maintain eye contact with the judge? 
Did you use appropriate gestures for emphasis? 
D. Verbal Language 
Did you use correct vocabulary and grammar 
Did you avoid excessive informality of speech 
E . Notes 
Did you present your argument without relying 
excessively on notes? 
III. Overall Impression 
A. Coherence 
Was your argument well organized? 
Was your argument logical? 
B. Comprehensiveness 
Was your argument thorough? 
How well did you discuss and analyze the 
substantive issues? 
C. Persuasiveness 
Did you treat the court with respect? 
2006) EFFECTIVE ORAL ARGUMENT SKILLS 907 
Did your argument appeal appropriately to 
public policy, justice, and fair play? 
Did you effectively maximize your strengths 
and minimize your weaknesses? 
D. Time 
Did you manage your allotted time effectively 
to enable you to present and support your 
major arguments? 
Had you decided in advance how much time 
to spend on each issue? 
Did you move from questions to arguments 
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